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INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM: 
THE STAKES FOR CRITICAL LEGAL 
THEORY 
ELIZABETH S. ANKER* & JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN** 
On September 17, 2020, Donald Trump spoke at the so-
called “White House Conference on American History.”1 The 
conference mission, Trump explained, was to “clear away the 
twisted web of lies” propagated by “the left.” As Trump saw it, 
the problem wasn’t only that “left-wing mobs have torn down 
statutes of our founders, desecrated our memorials, and carried 
out a campaign of violence and anarchy.”2 The challenge for 
historians was deeper, since “the left has warped, distorted, 
and defiled the American story with deceptions, falsehoods, 
and lies.”3 In order to demystify these ideological poisons, 
Trump charged historians with the task of standing up against 
the toxic propaganda machine of—wait for it—critical race the-
ory, a “Marxist doctrine holding that America is a wicked and 
racist nation.”4 Teaching the doctrines of critical theory, Trump 
explained, was “a form of child abuse in the truest sense of 
those words.”5 On January 18, 2021,6 Trump’s Advisory 1776 
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 1. Remarks by President Trump at the White House Conference on American 
History, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Sept. 17, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
white-house-conference-american-history/ [https://perma.cc/SL59-ABXE]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Which, of course, fell on the Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday. 
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Commission doubled down.7 Dedicated to helping young people 
“understand the history and principles of the founding of the 
United States,”8 the Commission expanded Trump’s earlier at-
tacks on critical race theory, including the more general terrain 
of critical theory writ large.9 Naming the Frankfurt School as 
the intellectual source for what would later become critical race 
theory, the Commission Report argued that critical theory’s 
brand of identity politics begins by entrenching the racial and 
sexual identities of American citizens, proceeds to rank-order 
these “racial and social groups . . . with disproportionate moral 
worth allotted to each,” and concludes by demanding atone-
ment and punishment in perpetuity for “America.”10 Notably, 
the Commission seemed fully aware that it was assigning to 
critical theory the very same intellectual maneuvers of a racial 
ideology that had once helped justify American slavery. Its Re-
port spelled out that logic: 
In portraying America as racist and white supremacist, 
identity politics advocates follow Lincoln’s great rival, Ste-
phen A. Douglas, who wrongly claimed that American gov-
ernment “was made on the white basis” “by white men, for 
the benefit of white men.” Indeed, there are uncanny simi-
larities between 21st century activists of identity politics and 
19th century apologists for slavery.11  
In a seemingly parallel universe, in the summer of 2020 
the University of Colorado established a new interdisciplinary 
research center, its Center for Critical Thought.12 Modeled af-
ter similar efforts like Columbia’s Center for Contemporary 
Critical Thought,13 these Centers embody the alleged webs of 
lies and ideological distortions that so vex the likes of Trump 
and his allies. As engines for the study of critical theory, they 
 




 8. Id. at 1. 
 9. See id. at 30. 
 10. Id. at 29. 
 11. Id. 
 12. CTR. FOR CRITICAL THOUGHT, https://www.colorado.edu/center
/criticalthought/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A8LC-7WHF].  
 13. COLUM. CTR. FOR CONTEMP. CRITICAL THOUGHT, https://
cccct.law.columbia.edu/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/45FQ-48GC].  
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disseminate the very histories aimed at exposing deep struc-
tures of subjugation, domination, and exploitation that the 
Presidential Commission spectralizes as existential threats to 
the fabric of the American way of life. There are, of course, 
many fascinating features about the unfolding debate (if “de-
bate” is really the right word here). But what merits our pre-
sent focus is this: What has happened in the sociocultural cli-
mate when a “Presidential Commission” finds it perfectly 
justifiable to condemn teachers of critical theory, but without 
supporting that view with anything resembling academic cre-
dentials, citations, sources, or arguments? What does it mean 
when an official commission offers a caricatured display of 
“ideology-critique” designed to demystify critical theory itself? 
What are we to do with critical theory when it has seemingly 
devolved into such a state that it can be facilely coopted by 
Trump’s cronies? How did we get here, and perhaps more im-
portantly, where does critical theory go in the future? 
One starting point is to blame social media. On the one 
hand, in its grandeur the web grants an everlasting license for 
critique. In the low stakes of the Twitterverse, users like 
Trump have capitalized on this license to slash and burn, pur-
porting to show truth to power. On the other hand, it is precise-
ly this explosion of perspectives, information, viewpoints, facts, 
and everything else that has drummed up a background hum of 
false equivalences. For so many of us, media saturation can 
seem to induce paralysis of judgment—or the curious reverse, 
judgement without reflection, unrelenting criticism predicated 
on an absence of thought. Either we cannot decide, or we have 
already decided. 
This combination of “critical license” with media overload 
churns out a popular skepticism always on the ready to “de-
bunk.” But debunk what, exactly? And more importantly, what 
does this mean for academic expertise, including the spirit of 
critique long espoused by critical theory? Most immediately, 
the omnipresent skepticism, ideological warfare, and shrillness 
of public debate all suggest a wholesale lack of a clear and co-
herent understanding of what genuine criticism should be 
(whatever that might be). But at the same time, the dominant 
response from intellectuals has been predictable: to assault the 
debunking of facts with more rounds of facts. Scientists re-
spond to climate skepticism and anti-vaxxers with data, all in 
the hopes of triumphing in the battle between fact and fiction. 
Watchdog groups subject misleading and false claims by politi-
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cians to rigorous “fact-checking.” Journalists fend off accusa-
tions of bias by diligently representing “both sides” of an issue. 
And yet, these appeals to “what is really going on” can feel 
fruitless.  
But from another point of departure, it is not so clear that 
greater critical distance and detachment will help us confront 
this apparent crisis in our very ability to think. Because the 
current mood of rampant debunking can seem to breed cavalier 
indifference not only to facts per se but also to the sorts of val-
ues and commitments necessary to orient principled political 
action and debate. Perhaps criticism instead needs to better 
theorize its relationship to praxis, or even to undertake the dif-
ficult labor of proposing, affirming, and defending substantive 
ideals that might help us remake our existing social structures. 
For instance, it goes without saying that the war on facts has 
led to an erosion of collective trust, so perhaps one task for crit-
ical theory is to devote itself to the rebuilding of public trust in 
civic discourse and process. 
Yet however one responds to our present situation, there is 
no question that it demands a revitalization of critical practice. 
If the very idea of critique has become fraught—if not fully mu-
tilated with misuse—what future can we hope for critical theo-
ry? Needless to say, citing to the so-called crisis in truth is 
merely one way to account for the unprecedented challenges 
facing critique in the present. The essays that follow offer a col-
lection of varying explanations for this current juncture—
including proposals for how we might negotiate it. Just as this 
issue’s contributors differ in their assessments, they similarly 
arrive at competing answers to the matter of how critical legal 
thought should respond. Similarly, although recent years have 
newly exposed the seeming fragility of many bulwarks of de-
mocracy, the rule of law, and civic reason, many underlying 
factors that enabled the Trump presidency long precede his 
election. As such, it is imperative to take the long view of both 
our contemporary geopolitical moment and the many traditions 
of critical thinking practiced within the academy and beyond. 
Over the last decades of the twentieth century, critical the-
ory and its offshoots spread throughout the humanities and be-
yond, ranging from the law school to the music school and eve-
rywhere in between. No doubt exists over that tradition’s 
sweeping range of influence, and if anything the 1776 Commis-
sion ironically only confirms that diagnostic authority. But how 
should we historicize critique? Given the specter of authoritari-
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anism, it is certainly tempting to draw parallels with the era 
that give birth to the Frankfurt School, for some suggesting an 
onus to return to those roots. But those mid-century origins of 
theory have since developed in countless unexpected directions, 
merging with other philosophical schools and flowering into a 
rich and diverse intellectual formation. One active debate on 
the table therefore lies with the status of those many modes of 
conducting theory, including their varying usefulness and rele-
vance to divergent fields within the academy. For instance 
within cultural and literary theory, some have asked about the 
potential trajectories of post-critique.14 But does post-critique 
make sense in the context of the legal academy? Critical theory 
has surely never been mainstreamed to the same extent as 
within other humanities and social science disciplines, so might 
critical legal theory still be in its adolescence? 
From another angle, recent disregard for the rule and in-
stitutions of law might seem to suggest that critique can no 
longer be claimed as the exclusive province of the progressive 
left. Reactionary political actors have learned to weaponize the 
tools of critique, among other things enlisting relativism and 
denialism to shore up right-wing agendas. This syndrome be-
comes especially vivid with regard to the critiques of law his-
torically associated with a primarily left or progressive stance. 
It has been a frequent premise of critical theory that “legal-
ism,” far from being neutral, represents an inherently “liberal” 
if not right-wing ideology—and that unflagging allegiance to 
the institutions, doctrines, procedures, and rule of law in gen-
eral will camouflage as well as rationalize structures of injus-
tice and oppression. These baseline assumptions have orga-
nized much critical legal theory. However, reactionary politics 
today can appear to adopt a polar opposite stance toward law 
and legalism, instead laying active siege to the very institu-
tions long presumed to be structural supports reinforcing the 
status quo and its patterns of exclusion. Far from a strictly left-
ist strategy, critiquing and undermining the rule of law has 
thus become a frequent ruse among the right. But these recog-
nitions beg the question of how critical legal theory should ap-
proach this changing ideological landscape. Is it imperative for 
critical legal thinkers to shed a certain brand of skepticism and 
instead embrace the very legal principles, norms, and institu-
tions long inspiring critique? 
 
 14. See, e.g., RITA FELSKI, THE LIMITS OF CRITIQUE (2015). 
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This shifting ideological terrain crystallizes the sorts of 
tensions confronted by the essays that follow. Many contribu-
tors to this Symposium accordingly ask whether the targets of 
critique should remain the same, or instead whether progres-
sive legal theory should focus on new, different objectives and 
goals. For instance, the status of political economy within criti-
cal legal theory occupies multiple contributions, although their 
authors arrive at different conclusions. For Chris Tomlins, crit-
ical legal theorists have been too quick to cabin Marx and his 
influence. Tomlins therefore advocates a revitalized investment 
in Marx and his specific critiques of political economy. In con-
trast, Richard Ford cautions that not all attention to political 
economy is inherently helpful. In particular, many contempo-
rary theorists have been overly preoccupied with “neoliberal-
ism,” aggrandizing that phenomena and thereby assigning it 
with disproportionate analytic weight. 
Other contributors venture alternate frameworks for map-
ping the distinctive landscape of our current geopolitical cross-
roads. While examining the enduring connection between cri-
tique and crisis, Ben Golder grapples with both a mood of 
growing desperation and the seductiveness of crisis as a mind-
set mirroring our contemporary moment. For Golder, the pre-
sent is unparalleled precisely because the very existence of cri-
tique faces heightened jeopardy. Both Aziza Ahmed and 
Marianne Constable similarly contend with perceptions of esca-
lating crisis due to mounting dangers to the public sphere and 
civic exchange. For Ahmed, there is a need to reexamine the re-
lation between law, science, and expertise, including to ques-
tion the frequently ambivalent attitude toward truth and “ex-
pertise” within radical social movements. Constable instead 
focuses on the diminishing reliability of public speech. Alt-
hough that erosion of civic discourse is a byproduct of relatively 
unprecedented recent phenomena, Constable submits that the 
critical theory canon nevertheless contains resources for ad-
dressing that crisis. As Constable shows, J.L. Austin’s famed 
lectures on speech act theory can help us understand the capac-
ity of utterances to “go wrong,” mutating from “promises” into 
“threats.” 
As some of the following essays argue, our current era ren-
ders it imperative to better define critique, including to deline-
ate its boundaries from other genres of thought. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, however, those contributors single out a number 
of different methodological impulses and objectives. For in-
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stance, Jorge L. Esquirol studies the stock repertoire of recur-
ring “critical moves” that have organized progressive legal 
scholarship. In taxonomizing those standard moves, Esquirol 
simultaneously asks whether they have at times rendered criti-
cal theory overly formulaic and insufficiently attuned to con-
text. Enlisting the lessons of comparative legal study, Esquirol 
ventures a plea for greater attention to the sociopolitical effects 
of those staples of critique. 
In this respect, there is a growing importance for left cri-
tique to distinguish itself from the sorts of cavalier naysaying 
and subterfuge that have ravaged democratic discourse and 
participation. But at the same time, critical legal theory con-
fronts a parallel onus to justify its differences from more mod-
erate or centrist political agendas as well as intellectual-
rhetorical modes. Leti Volpp thus compares two contrasting 
immigration policy statements—the Immigration Platform of 
the Biden campaign and the “Migrant Justice Platform”—in 
order to highlight the troubling assumptions that can underlie 
liberal reform agendas. Unlike the Biden agenda, the Migrant 
Justice Platform models collectivist, grassroots practices of cri-
tique, underscoring the ongoing value of a progressive com-
mitment to a principled criticism. 
Seeking to distinguish progressive critique from main-
stream legal reasoning, Charles Barzun argues that critical 
theory can be identified by its “holistic” approach aimed at 
analysis that is inextricably explanatory and normative. What 
this means is that critical legal thinkers should recognize their 
affinity with scholars who have at times been dismissed among 
the left (Barzun’s example is Catherine MacKinnon). At once, it 
is this holistic orientation that renders critical theory especial-
ly well equipped to analyze the common law. Analogously, Pau-
lo Barrozo maintains that critical legal thought must separate 
itself from the brands of critique practiced in conventional legal 
scholarship, given how that tradition has served to operational-
ize liberalism as an ideology. Barrozo instead promotes a juris-
prudence of distribution, which can be conceptualized vis-à-vis 
a set of elements like “epistemic confidence” and the “evalua-
tion of means.” 
Peter Gable and Peter Goodrich both offer historical ac-
counts of critical legal theory and its evolution—although they 
emphasize contrasting elements of that tradition. For Gabel, 
both the Marxist and Critical Legal Studies variants of critical 
theory generate accounts of “alienation” that are incomplete 
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without attention to intersubjective desires for recognition. 
Gabel argues that those social interconnections can prove 
transformatively dis-alienating, just as they are frequently 
harnessed within radical social movements. In a similar spirit, 
Goodrich also seizes upon the energetic style of critical legal 
theory, celebrating that vitalism and the process of just becom-
ing it can inspire. For Goodrich, the roots of theory must there-
fore be located in performative musicality and poetics: in what 
he terms “the jurisliterary.” 
Other contributions to this Symposium apply theory to 
contemplate specific legal issues and debates, exemplifying the 
work of critical legal scholarship in practice. For instance, Mi-
khail Xifaras develops a “theory of legal characters” designed to 
distill the diverse attitudes of varying legal actors toward the 
legal system. Expanding on the frequent analogy between law 
and theater, Xifaras demonstrates the many ways that legal 
actors’ choices and behavior are inherently mediated. Here, the 
context of the French Constitutional Council offers a case study 
through which Xifaras illustrates the more global implications 
of his theory. 
Bernard Harcourt instead looks to theoretical debates 
about rights in order to illustrate certain blind spots afflicting 
much critical legal theory. As Harcourt argues, theorists have 
tended either to critique rights by mistakenly reducing them to 
purely instrumental tools or to philosophically account for the 
promise of rights in ways that sever them from actual legal 
practice. For Harcourt, rights therefore exemplify both the fre-
quent disconnect between theoria and praxis and the need for a 
constant confrontation between those domains. 
Finally, while pedagogy is a theme informing many essays 
in this Symposium, Chantal Thomas and Daniel J. Sequeira 
inquire centrally into the role of the law school classroom in 
forging a critical mindset. In her essay, Thomas defends the 
role of critical theory within the law school classroom, canvass-
ing influential critiques of legal education ventured by thinkers 
including Duncan Kennedy, Kim Crenshaw, and Karl Klare. 
Simultaneously reflecting on her own experience as a student 
as well as professor, Thomas offers an example from her 1L 
Contracts syllabus to illustrate how curriculum might be re-
vised in ways designed to facilitate structural critiques of rac-
ism. For Sequeira, by contrast, the forms of “unsettling” intrin-
sic to critical legal analysis necessarily occur beyond the 
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classroom’s purview, in spaces exempt from the homogenizing 
gravitational pull of a formal legal education. 
The essays that follow all differently reflect on the stakes 
for critical legal theory. Yet while drawing varying assess-
ments, this Symposium’s contributors all agree that those 
stakes could not be higher: that the project of critical legal the-
ory is as urgent as ever. In such a spirit does this Symposium 
set out to rethink that project, with simultaneous reference to 
its past, present, and future. 
 
